Regulatory Oversight
Regulatory Checkbook was founded in 2001 to provide an independent source of information about the effects of major federal regulations and the quality of the benefit-cost analyses produced to support them.
Our first foray into regulatory oversight was the design and implementation of a scheme for grading regulatory impact analyses prepared by federal agencies.
This scheme established what at the time was considered a generous standard for satisfactory performance. For example, to earn a grade of F, an agency regulatory impact analysis had to include an error so great that an agency head reasonably in tune with Congressional instructions, as contained in the statute delegating legislative authority to the agency, would have made a different decision had the error not been made.
Our research discovered that errors of this magnitude were endemic, thus destroying the grading scheme's ability to distinguish between high- and low-quality RIAs.
Our first foray into regulatory oversight was the design and implementation of a scheme for grading regulatory impact analyses prepared by federal agencies.
This scheme established what at the time was considered a generous standard for satisfactory performance. For example, to earn a grade of F, an agency regulatory impact analysis had to include an error so great that an agency head reasonably in tune with Congressional instructions, as contained in the statute delegating legislative authority to the agency, would have made a different decision had the error not been made.
Our research discovered that errors of this magnitude were endemic, thus destroying the grading scheme's ability to distinguish between high- and low-quality RIAs.
Regulatory Checkbook Comments on OMB Reports to Congress
Beginning with FY 1997, the US Office of Management and Budget has been required by law to submit annual reports to Congress on the benefits and costs of Federal regulation. Specifically, the law directs OMB to provide:
(1) an estimate of the total annual costs and benefits (including quantifiable and nonquantifiable effects) of Federal rules and paperwork, to the extent feasible--
(A) in the aggregate;
(B) by agency and agency program; and
(C) by major rule;
(2) an analysis of impacts of Federal regulation on State, local, and tribal government, small business, wages, and economic growth; and
(3) recommendations for reform.
The law does not specify what kind or quality of "estimates" or "analyses" OMB is to provide. For that reason, for every annual report OMB publishes only estimates prepared and endorsed by the regulatory agencies themselves. It never discloses its reviews of the quality of these estimates, nor does it disclose its own estimates. Regulatory Checkbook submitted comments on several of these reports, but stopped doing so when it became apparent that OMB was determined to be unresponsive.
Because OMB is committed to not provide useful, independent information, public interest in commenting on draft reports has declined precipitously over the years. Meanwhile, the quality of the reports continues to decline. Regulatory Checkbook filed an error correction request with respect to the FY 2008 report documenting numerous violations of OMB's own Information Quality Guidelines. In its response, OMB did not address any of the errors identified.
(1) an estimate of the total annual costs and benefits (including quantifiable and nonquantifiable effects) of Federal rules and paperwork, to the extent feasible--
(A) in the aggregate;
(B) by agency and agency program; and
(C) by major rule;
(2) an analysis of impacts of Federal regulation on State, local, and tribal government, small business, wages, and economic growth; and
(3) recommendations for reform.
The law does not specify what kind or quality of "estimates" or "analyses" OMB is to provide. For that reason, for every annual report OMB publishes only estimates prepared and endorsed by the regulatory agencies themselves. It never discloses its reviews of the quality of these estimates, nor does it disclose its own estimates. Regulatory Checkbook submitted comments on several of these reports, but stopped doing so when it became apparent that OMB was determined to be unresponsive.
Because OMB is committed to not provide useful, independent information, public interest in commenting on draft reports has declined precipitously over the years. Meanwhile, the quality of the reports continues to decline. Regulatory Checkbook filed an error correction request with respect to the FY 2008 report documenting numerous violations of OMB's own Information Quality Guidelines. In its response, OMB did not address any of the errors identified.
